The readings in Entman’s Projections of Power and our class discussions on them focused on three case studies of media framing of three U.S. foreign policy initiatives—the American military actions in Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), and Panama (1989-90). Entman shows how the media failed to develop a valid oppositional narrative to counter the narrative framed by the White House in each of these situations. Class discussions elaborated on a number of underlying factors that played a role in ultimately shaping policy, how American power was subsequently projected, and how the American public viewed these events. Indeed, the class discussions demonstrated the iterative nature of the foreign policymaking process, as an analysis of these cases indicated that a number of factors based on other events had considerable impact on these situations, which were far from being isolated cases with one meaningful rationale. For example, the situation in Grenada was far from being a simple Cold War action against communism, but was rather impacted by a variety of issues, among which the class noted as consisting of factors like the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Falkland war, the bombings of U.S. military barracks in Lebanon, the Monroe Doctrine, the legacy of the Vietnam War, and the legacy of the Carter Presidency and the associated feelings of American weakness that the Reagan Administration sought to dispel. The concern over the notion of being aware of “dragons” with respect to dangers of reinterpreting what happened in the past, specifically prior to the Cold War, surfaced in the discussion. Indeed, this leads to the larger question of the ways in which this peril and potential pitfall has arisen in contemporary framing of events in the pre-9/11 world. In what ways have we unconsciously adjusted our views on historical events preceding the September 11th attacks to fit our given post-9/11 mindset and the way in which we currently view the world? At the same time, Entman’s analysis of the prewar debate prior to the Persian Gulf War raises the question of how significant the issue of urgency to act in a given crisis is in framing the debate. In other words, Entman points out how the lack of an urgent and immediate need to act during the debate over the Persian Gulf War provided ample time for the media to investigate matters and for elites to debate issues. Yet this was not the case with respect to the urgent nature of the challenge in the Grenada crisis. Indeed, are we able to see similar parallels in how time may have played a factor in the framing of debates in similar foreign policy crises in near recent times? Just as with the Grenada crisis, a sense of urgency existed prior to the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, due to the immense desire for a swift response to the shocking terrorist attacks on September 11th. However, in the case of the buildup to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a similar sense of immediate danger did not exist, and as a result, more ample time existed for debate, and hence, the chances for the White House framing of the issue to remain adequately challenged greatly increased. The continued analyses of Entman’s models, historical examples, and case studies, coupled with the success of class discussions in determining issues Entman does not cover, as well as the overall implications and questions raised by the discussions, translate into a stimulating class experience thus far.
Entman’s exploration of how events are framed in relation to policymakers, the media, and the public centers around a discussion of how to appropriately grasp the nature of frames themselves. Due to his view that facets of the hegemony and index models, such as the hegemony model’s failure to account for the current lack of consensus among elites, are outdated in a post-Cold War political environment, Entman presents the model of cascading activation as a more accurate lens through which the framing of news, U.S. foreign policy, and public opinion, can be understood. Entman provides the example of how the Bush Administration effectively framed the tragic events surrounding the September 11th attacks in a manner that fit a logical narrative that enabled the administration to pursue its ideological agenda in both the foreign policy and domestic policy realms. Despite the remarkably high level of patriotism, and subsequent deference to the administration, that permeated through the media following the September 11th attacks, Entman notes that the media refused to completely tout the White House line in the buildup to the Iraq war, contrary to the media’s full deference to the White House during the early Cold War. Indeed, this raises the question as to whether there can ever again be such a comparable level of deference on the part of the media to the White House. If the media refrained from such deference during a climate as nationalistic as the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the answer appears to be no. Indeed, the overall level of cynicism in the age of “gotcha journalism” and the overall higher levels of accountability and transparency that exist in the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam War era suggest that the level of enthusiastic deference to the government on the part of the media during the height of the Cold War cannot be replicated in contemporary times. Additional questions arise regarding the unique state of the media-government nexus during the post-9/11 environment, and whether the exceptional nature of an event with the kind of emotional impact on the American psyche as September 11th equips any framing model adequately enough, regardless of its overall strength as a model, to place the post-September 11th period within an exact and formulaic framework of understanding. Indeed, the detailed breakdown of Entman’s models in class provides a good grounding for grasping the theoretical facets of the subject matter in the course. The additional time devoted to analyzing President Obama’s inaugural address in class provided an excellent opportunity to critically think about the relationship between foreign policy and audiences in a highly relevant, tangible, and contemporary example. As a result, class was both instructive and interesting, though it may have been more preferable to have spent even more time discussing the inaugural address and its connections to the themes, ideas, and subject matter of the course thus far.
The Chinese government faces several upcoming sensitive anniversaries over the course of the year that are likely to feed into the growing desire for political reform in China. In December, over 300 Chinese dissidents made an extensive call for democratic change. On January 12th, political activists called for a boycott of China’s state-owned television. This year is marked with key anniversaries for various dissident movements. June 4th is the 20th anniversary of the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests while on March 10th, Tibetans will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the failed Tibetan uprising that resulted in the exile of the Dalai Lama from China. July 22nd marks the 10th anniversary of the banning of the Falun Gong. Considering October 1st is the 60th anniversary of the start of Communist Party rule in China, Chinese authorities will be particularly eager to suppress dissent and prevent disorder. Dissidents have successfully compiled an online petition known as Charter 08, in which calls for a number of changes are made, ranging from the establishment of a multiparty democracy to permitting land to be owned privately. The Chinese government swiftly responded to the threat posed by Charter 08 by removing postings on the document from the internet, shutting down pro-Charter 08 blogs, hassling several Charter 08 signatories, and detaining Liu Xiaobo, the primary organizer of Charter 08. Factors such as China’s weakening economy and the contaminated milk scandal have already led to increased public discontent with the government. The official Chinese media have even warned that 2009 could mark a “peak period for mass incidents”. Nevertheless, most do not expect to see disorder on the level of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, for as the Beijing Institute of Technology’s Hu Xingdou explains, the overall public eagerness for swift political change appears to be relatively low.
Last June, Chinese internet usage exceeded that of the United States’ usage, as China emerged as the largest internet user in the world. Currently, at approximately 298 million, the number of Chinese internet users is roughly equivalent to the entire population of the United States. The official ChinaInternetNetworkInformationCenter announced that China experienced a 42% increase in internet usage since 2007, as 88 million Chinese went online for the first time in 2008. Additionally, a 113% increase in mobile web surfing occurred since 2007, with 117.6 million new mobile web users. However, while these figures are impressive, the percentage of the Chinese population that utilizes the internet is dwarfed by the percentage of Americans that use the internet, as only 23% of the Chinese population use the internet compared with 73% of Americans that use the internet. The Chinese government also heavily monitors and limits the use of the internet. Chinese officials block a number of websites and blogs that are deemed as constituting a threat to state security on a regular basis.
Tim Geithner’s declaration that China has been “manipulating” its currency has generated concern among global investors over the possibility of Sino-US tensions in an already tumultuous international economic environment. Geithner vowed that the Obama Administration would “aggressively” press China to change its alleged policy of currency manipulation. Given the legal implications that are associated with the term “currency manipulation”, Geithner’s words signal are indicative of a change in the United States’ approach towards China. While the Bush Administration had urged Beijing to strengthen the yuan, it cautiously refrained from labeling China a currency manipulator. As a result, Geithner’s use of the term suggests the Obama Administration plans to adopt a tougher stand against Beijing’s disinclination to increase the acceleration of the yuan. Yet in the short-term, the global economy would be benefited more greatly if the Obama Administration focused on ensuring China implements effective stimulus measures. Furthermore, a tough stand on China could easily encourage US legislators to adopt protectionist policies towards China, which would exacerbate the global economic crisis. Additionally, the Chinese government has historically not responded well to public reprimands. Indeed, given that the international community is plunged in its worst financial crisis in seven decades, mounting Sino-US friction could not come at a more undesirable time.
For the first time since he is thought to have experienced a stroke, Kim Jong-il held his first public meeting with a foreign official. The Chinese state-run news agency, Xinhua, reported that Kim met with Wang Jiarui, a senior Communist Party official who heads the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party. Xinhua reported that Wang traveled to meet with Kim in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, in order to discuss an increase in Sino-North Korean economic and trade ties. Kim hosted a lunch for Wang and the Chinese delegation, while Wang presented Kim with a personal letter from Chinese President Hu Jintao. Since China is the closest ideological ally to North Korea, several experts had predicted that Kim would invite a Chinese dignitary to indicate his continuing hold on power following his recent decline in health.
The Chinese government is currently facing the worst unemployment crisis China has experienced in decades. Migrants, students, and urban white-collar employees have all been considerably negatively impacted by the global economic crisis. In particular, once booming and rapidly-emerging cities like the northern Chinese city of Xinji have suffered significantly from declining demand for its exports. Administrators in Xinji and cities throughout China have often stated that a minimum growth rate of 8% is required to ensure unemployment does not lead to major unrest. In light of this, local Chinese officials who have strived to reach high growth rates now have great cause for concern. Zhang Guoliang, Xinji’s party chief, was forced to lower his expectations for growth, despite his commitment to making certain that high growth rates would continue. It is estimated that as many as 15 million Chinese laborers from the countryside that also work outside of their home areas will become unemployed. Millions of unemployed migrants that remain in cities are likely to increase crime rates and protest. As a result, the Chinese government has sought to placate these farmers via policies such as encouraging banks to give them loans, offering migrants free job training, and substantially increasing agricultural subsidies. In recent years, rural discontent has generated protests and unrest—a fact that concerns the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, rising unemployment among students and graduates and subsequent student discontent is of especial concern to the Chinese government, as students have often been at the forefront of political upheavals throughout Chinese history.
81 individuals have been detained as part of an aggressive Chinese security sweep in Tibet. While the Chinese officially announced the sweep as part of a larger effort to crack down on crime, advocates of Tibetan independence maintain that the sweep is intended to intimidate Tibetans on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. Following the largest Tibetan protests in decades last March in Lhasa, the Chinese government has been in the process of readying itself for the possibility of additional Tibetan unrest. On January 18th, the Public Security Bureau of Lhasa launched a “strike hard” campaign directed at crime. The state-run Tibetan Daily reported that the ensuing crackdown included raids on Internet cafes, rented rooms, residential areas, and bars. In order to amplify the quantity of individuals who are arrested, normal prosecution and arrest practices are generally put aside during “strike hard” campaigns. According to the Tibetan Daily, people have been detained for reasons ranging from prostitution, theft, robbery, and indeterminate criminal activities such as having “reactionary music” on one’s cell phone.
